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Trade and Investment Treaties,
the Rule of Law, and Standards of
the Administration of Justice
Alejandro M. Garrol
Thank you very much for the invitation to this exciting brainstorming session about the impact that trade agreements have on
human rights. When Professor Rosenn extended the invitation to
me, I saw it as an excellent and very propitious challenge to think
about some areas of the law that don't generally occupy my time.
As Professor Rosenn observed, international trade and human
rights have generally been treated separately. But as Professor
Powell told us, it is academic settings like today's symposium that
allow specialists in the two fields to think about how they are
linked with each other-or, as Professor Grossman put it, to draw
analogies across different domains of communication. That is
what I intend to do today.
Part of the challenge of this discussion is to take seriously the
comparisons that can be drawn between the two fields of international trade agreements and the international protection of
human rights, especially in implementation and enforcement.
Both fields challenge us to think about how to implement, adapt,
and actually enforce broadly worded treaty-based rules in everyday life.
But more than a comparison is at stake. International trade
and human rights are inevitably linked. One tends to think that
fostering free market societies is generally coupled with individual prosperity and happiness. And why should free markets not
also foster respect for basic human rights and democracy? What
we don't know yet is how to make them coordinate and work
together in a way that one would mutually support the other.
Professor Powell proposes that the trade liberalization regime
could be quite favorable to human rights protection. Including
human rights protections-even if limited to labor and environmental rights-in a free trade agreement potentially extends the
benefits of trade law's enforcement mechanisms to human rights.
1. J.D. (Abogado) (National University of La Plata), LL.M (Louisiana State
University), J.S.D. (Columbia University). Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia
University School of Law, and Senior Research Scholar, Parker School of Foreign and
Comparative Law, Columbia University.
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But as he acknowledges, this outcome is not guaranteed, especially if the dispute resolution mechanisms for the human rights
provisions are weaker than those that apply to the trade portions
of the agreements. Professor Gantz argues, in his very thorough
analysis of dozens of regional trade agreements, that rather than
focus on strengthening the dispute resolution mechanisms for the
human rights provisions, it would be most helpful to improve
what he calls the procedural mechanisms of implementation for
them; well-funded agencies charged with enforcing these basic
labor rights and environmental protection provisions could do
much to bring trade and human rights together.
To these fruitful contributions by Professors Powell and
Gantz concerning international trade, I would like to add a focus
on the regime of the protection and promotion of foreign investments. Much of the foreign investment that has been spurred in
the last decades has been through regional trade agreements and
bilateral investment treaties-not dozens, or even hundreds, but
now probably almost twenty thousand. Each one of them includes
substantive provisions, very broadly worded, that push the governments that are host to these investments to adhere to the rule
of law or to protect individual rights. Some of these provisions,
including national treatment and most favored nation treatment,
focus on ending discrimination by nationality. But what are we to
make of the more broadly worded provisions, such as those calling
for "fair and equitable treatment" or "full protection and security"?
What does it mean for a country to commit itself to provide fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security to foreign
investors or nationals from the other contracting states?
International human rights law presents an analogous problem. Professor Rosenn remarked how "elusive" many of its substantive rights are, expressed in broad phrases such as due
process, freedom of expression, the right to life-all terms that are
conceivably susceptible to more than one interpretation. Yet
through many years of the development of jurisprudence, in part
through enforcement by supranational regional tribunals such as
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, we have come close to some kind of harmonized agreement
about the minimum standards of human rights protection.
In the area of the protection and promotion of foreign investments, we don't have enforcement through supranational regional
tribunals. Defining and gradually agreeing on what phrases like
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"fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security"
mean will come through the mechanism of investor-state, treatybased arbitration. This mechanism consists of hundreds of ad hoc
arbitral tribunals which have the duty to make judgment calls as
to what it means, for example, to give protection to the legitimate
expectations of foreign investors.
As you can see, even these words, "protection" and "legitimate
expectations," are extremely troublesome. They raise the question
whether the particular expectations that a foreign investor may
have when it makes an investment are justifiable, and what duty
the host government may have to protect the investor by improving its legal regime after the investment has been made. Even
more challenging, it seems to me, is the obligation to provide
investors with legal or full protection and security. That phrase
means at least some kind of physical police protection, but it
clearly means something more than that, for without legal security investments and trade cannot take place.
Now what are the obligations of "legal security"? They definitely include protection of certain substantive rights, coupled
with meaningful remedies-some kind of due process-to enforce
them within a reasonable time. But what, concretely, does this
mean?
Consider the Loewen case, to which Professor Rosenn
referred.2 It raises the basic issue of what minimum standard of
legal security that any system-jury-based or otherwise-should
provide. In Loewen, Mississippi's legal system had awarded a U.S.
plaintiff $400 million in punitive damages and $75 million for
emotional distress as part of a $500 million judgment against a
Canadian corporation for state tort, contract, and antitrust
claims; it had then required the defendant to post a bond of 125
percent of the total damages just to appeal. Should the standard of
"legal security" forbid punitive damages because many if not most
countries consider them to be against public policy? Or should
punitive damages be allowed but limited to torts as opposed to
breach of contract? Should there be a requirement of proportionality between the punitive damages and the compensatory damages-a requirement the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed in the

2. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, reprinted
in 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, June 26, 2003,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
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U.S? 3
These questions, and many others, are far from being definitively delineated in international law. Might it be possible to formulate a minimum or core set of standards for the legal security
host states owe investors? In taking up this challenge, one
approach would be to look to the bright-line minimum standards
of international human right law, which forbids certain core
wrongs, including torture, forced disappearances, summary executions, and censorship of expression. Similarly, in 1998 the International Labour Organization formulated a limited set of core
labor standards, represented by four fundamental principles. 4
The interest of this basic question-what content to give
broad phrases like "fair and equitable treatment"-was evident in
an arbitral case in which I was involved as a member of the arbitral tribunal.' Foreign investors had made a very significant
investment in a country that was party to a bilateral investment
treaty promising foreign investors "fair and equitable treatment,"
"full protection and security," and treatment equivalent to that
provided to any other foreign investors or domestic investors. The
investment involved the purchase of a sizable amount of land for
citrus plantations in an almost abandoned area of the country.
The plantations were subsequently invaded by squatters who
lived in the neighboring area and sought land to cultivate. Not
surprisingly, this massive land invasion moved the foreign investor to seek redress in the local courts. Yet after many years of frustrating experience trying to have the leaders of the squatters
group apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted, and of also making
all kinds of efforts to obtain relief through diplomatic means, the
squatters were still there. The failure to evict the squatters eventually prompted a notice of arbitration, filed against the country.
In the notice of arbitration the foreign investor asserted that it
had plainly not received the full protection and security that not
only a foreign investor but also a national investor should expect.
The arbitral case was discontinued before it reached the mer3. E.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
4. See Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO, 86th
Sess. (June 15, 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/
textdeclaration/lang-en/index.htm.
5. Fernando Cabrera Diaz and Damon Vis-Dunbar, Canadian Investors Sue
Costa Rica Alleging Failure to Protect Their Farm, Investment Treaty News, Oct. 28,
2008, available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/10/29/canadian-investors-sue-costarica-alleging-failure-to-protect-their-farm.

2011]

TRADE AND INVESTMENT TREATIES

271

its, 6 and I never had the occasion to discuss the substance of the
case with the other members of the panel or reach any conclusions
about the merits of the claims put forth in the complaint. A case of
this sort, though, raises some interesting general questions about
the extent to which a host country should or could be held liable
for failure to provide full protection and security. To resolve a
claim of this sort would require a tribunal to do something which
major tribunals actually are asked to do all the time-to pass
judgment on the degree to which a particular country adheres to
the rule of law. For example, in the United States a defendant
may assert a claim of forum non conveniens, a claim which if
accepted will result in dismissal of the case, leaving it be litigated
abroad.7 Resolution of the assertion of forum non conveniens
requires American courts not only to make sure that an alternative forum is in fact available, but also to determine whether the
foreign legal system provides an "adequate legal system." U.S.
courts have generally required only a very basic threshold for this
standard to met, ruling that as long the foreign legal system provides "meaningful" remedies, it is adequate.8 What is interesting
is that resolution of an assertion of forum non conveniens calls on
the U.S. courts to pass judgment on the adequacy of a foreign legal
system.
What is the rule of law promised by standards like fair and
equitable treatment or full protection and security? At the very
beginning of the symposium today, Professor Rosenn, asserted
that the rule of law of course implies those formal aspects that
every legal system should have-aspects that foreign investors
and international commercial traders want. These include
accountability, transparency, predictability, and stability. But
more is needed than these formal aspects, some substantive minimum content that is consistent with basic protection of human
rights postulates of international justice.
In practice, the substantive constraints that trade agree6. Quadrant Pacific Growth Fund L.P. and Canasco Holdings Inc. v. Republic of
Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/08/1 (Order of the Tribunal Taking Note of the
Discontinuance of the Proceeding and Allocation of Costs) (Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
QuadrantPacificGrowthFundVCostaRicaOrderEng.pdf.
7. E.g., Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,
425 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Virginia A Fitt, The Tragedy of Comity: Questioning the American
Treatment of Inadequate Foreign Courts, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 1021, 1031 (2010)
("Systemic problems within a foreign judiciary are only viewed as a justification for
denying a forum non conveniens dismissal in the gravest of circumstances.").
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ments and bilateral investment treaties will place on governments
are hard to predict in concrete cases. Not surprisingly, arbitral
tribunals and annulment committees do not always agree on the
application of the standards of fair and equitable treatment or full
protection and security, particularly when asked to render difficult judgment calls about the regulatory power of the host state.
How much "margin of appreciation" a state is accorded varies
starkly from arbitral award to arbitral award.
The challenge is to build transparent, consistent, and predictable outcomes under trade and investment treaty-based standards. Perhaps the substantive content of the rule of law could
include a bright-line minimum standard for the protection of
investments-a minimum degree of legal security that every
country in the world should be expected to provide to foreign
investors. There are reasonable arguments for this position. Certainly, no country should be able to claim it has adequately
observed the rule of law where it reaches decisions in an arbitrary
or xenophobic fashion. And while massive invasions of squattersa serious problem in many Latin American countries-can present especially difficult challenges, a stable country with a welldeveloped legal system and adequate resources should be able to
provide a relatively swift, effective response. The response does
not necessarily have to satisfy the investor, of course. What is
required is that the courts resolve the investor's claims in good
faith and reach a reasonably tenable decision, even if that ruling
is wrong.
In my view, though, apart from the case of arbitrary or discriminatory actions, there is a reasonable argument that the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment or full protection
and security should be measured in accordance with the range of
responses most realistic in light of the host country's judicial and
legal infrastructure. A poor country besieged by chronic failures in
its administration ofjustice simply might not be capable of providing as effective a response as a wealthier country to investor
claims. Not all countries have the same legal infrastructure to
redress wrongs, especially the type of socially explosive wrong
such as land invasions in developing countries with a large housing deficit and an unequal distribution of land.
One might question whether it is fair to investors to let the
host country escape its responsibilities by simply proving that the
government did the best it could have under the circumstances.
The answer lies in the notion of legitimate expectations. The due
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diligence that an investor performs before entering into a multimillion dollar investment in a foreign country should leave the
investor reasonably well-informed about the state's legal system
and administration of justice. Foreign investors in a poor country
cannot reasonably ignore the state's level of development, capacity, and resources. In practice, these resource constraints may
limit the host country's ability to provide the same type of legal
infrastructure and protection as one might see in a wealthier
country. There should, then, be a standard of due diligence on the
part of the investor-a standard which, while protecting foreign
investors from unfair, unequal, or arbitrary government action, is
sensitive to the resources available to the host country to provide
full protection and security.
How to articulate the rule of law is fundamental question of
great importance. Drawing both on trade and investment law and
on human rights law has the potential to give us more insightful
answers to this question. I now leave it to discussion and debate
by my commentators. Thank you very much.
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Comment
Stephen J. Schnably1
How much protection should foreign investors expect from a
state's judicial and law enforcement systems? As Professor Garro
notes, investment treaties typically promise foreign investors "fair
and equitable treatment" or "full protection and security."2 Not
unreasonably, investors expect these standards to include access
to a domestic system that reliably provides efficient, impartial,
and effective protection against invasions of their legal rights.
The quality of a state's administration of justice is important
even though under many investment treaties, foreign investors
may press claims before an international arbitral tribunal without
exhausting local remedies. 3 Where private actors invade an investor's rights, it might well be simpler for the investor to seek help
from local authorities, so long as they abide by the rule of law and
take appropriate action. In the example that Professor Garro
gives, however, peasants seeking land to cultivate repeatedly
invaded the investor's citrus plantations; the investor pressed the
state over several years to evict them, but to no avail.4 The failure
to provide adequate protection gave rise to the investor's claim
that the state had breached its investment treaty obligations, a
claim he was entitled to pursue before an international arbitral
tribunal. Had the state dealt effectively with the problem through
its local law enforcement and judicial systems, there would have
been no need for a treaty claim in the first place.
Professor Garro raises an important general question about
how an arbitral tribunal is to judge this kind of failure to provide
protection. He draws our attention to two different kinds of
approaches. One would be the establishment of a "bright line minimum standard of protection,"' a standard that any nation, even a
relatively poor one, could be expected to meet. This standard, he
suggests, could be like the international law prohibition of "tor1. Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Arthur
Baker for excellent research assistance.
2. Alejandro M. Garro, Trade and Investment Treaties, the Rule of Law, and
Standards of the Administration of Justice, 42 U. MLAMI INT-AM. L. REV. 269 (2011).
3. See Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 127-28 (2006).
4. See Garro, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 274.
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ture, forced disappearances, summary execution, and censorship
of expression."6 In the example that Professor Garro cites, this
approach would suggest that application of the "fair and equitable
treatment" or "full protection and security" standards should not
be affected by the nation's level of development. A complete failure
to protect a landowner's exclusive right to use its property would
seem to constitute a clear breach of the investment treaty.7
The other approach contemplates a variable standard for the
administration of justice, one which would look at "the State's
level of development, capacity, and resources."8 Suppose an investor invests in a relatively poor developing country that is
"besieged by chronic failures in its administration of justice."9
Should not the investor have known that realistically, the state
might well not be able to provide the kind of protection a more
developed nation could?"0 In the kind of case that Professor Garro
cites, for example, it might be that although the law formally protected the investor, the state's law enforcement and judicial systems were simply not capable of handling the cases effectively. If
the country were poor and violations of the law endemic, an organized land-invasion movement of many squatters might simply be
too much for law enforcement or the courts to handle. Perhaps the
claim that the investment treaty has been breached is unwarranted under such circumstances.
Confronted with a choice between a universal minimum stan6. Id. at 272.
7. Cf., e.g., Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/
93/1, T 3.04, 6.12-6.13 (Feb. 21, 1997), reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 1531, 1537, 1550 (1997)
(state's failure to prevent looting of investor's property by renegade military members
breached obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment). See also GAMI
Investments, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award of Nov. 15,
2004, 91 94, available through http://www.state.gov/s/1/c7119.htm ("The duty of
NAFTA tribunals is . . . to appraise whether and how preexisting laws and

regulations are applied to the foreign investor. It is no excuse that regulation is costly.
Nor does a dearth of able administrators or a deficient culture of compliance provide a
defence. Such is the challenge of governance that confronts every country. Breaches of
NAFTA are assuredly not to be excused on the grounds that a government's
compliance with its own law may be difficult.").
8. Garro, supra note 2, at 274.
9. Id.
10. Cf. Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'?: The Relevance of the Conduct of the
Investor Under the Fairand Equitable Treatment Standard, in INVESTMENT TREATY
LAW: CURRENT ISSUES II, at 205, 212 (Federico Ortino et al., eds. 2007) ("Not all
investment risks can, or should, be protected against. . . . Any assessment of
regulatory fairness will need to be made in the light of this factor."); id. at 223-25
(discussing arbitral rulings holding investor responsible for taking the risk of
investing in countries with troubled legal systems or economies).
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dard and one that varies with resources, Professor Garro argues
for a mixture of the two. There should be, he concludes, a "standard of due diligence on the part of the investor-a standard
which, while protecting foreign investors from unfair, unequal, or
arbitrary government action, is sensitive to the resources available to the host country to provide full protection and security." 11
His approach is certainly not without precedent. An investor's
legitimate expectations about the possibility of changes in the host
country's laws can play a key role in determining whether there
has been an expropriation. An investor may reasonably expect
some stability in the host country's relevant laws;1 2 but as one
arbitral panel put it, "[n] o investor may reasonably expect that the
circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is made
remain totally unchanged."13 Professor Garro's approach would
extend the question of legitimate expectations to include what the
investor might expect about the efficacy of the administration of
justice in light of the nation's resources.
Though his analysis moves us a long way toward a better
understanding of it, there is probably no fully satisfactory answer
to the question Professor Garro raises about how to judge a state's
administration of justice. Trade-offs are inevitable. I would like to
add some thoughts about what we might learn from international
human rights law about these trade-offs.
The first point I would make is that the two approaches correspond roughly to the division between civil and political rights, on
the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the
other. The "bright line minimum standard of protection" that Professor Garro outlines corresponds roughly to the typical approach
to civil and political human rights. Both are universal and not
dependent on a state's level of development. Torture is torture,
whether practiced by a rich or a poor country. To be sure, questions of cultural relativism have long been debated in human
11. Garro, supra note 2, at 270.
12. E.g., Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of
Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, 1$f 180-87 (London Court of International Arbitration
July 1, 2004) (Ecuador's alteration of tax law violated duty of fair and equitable
treatment by undermining investor's legitimate expectation of stability of the legal
environment), available
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/OxyEcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf. See Susan D. Franck, International Decision:
Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
675 (2005).
13. Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of
March 17, 2006, i
305, available through http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pagjd=1149.
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rights, particularly when it comes to women's rights,1 4 but arguments for relativism based on the level of development, while not
unknown,15 are hardly standard fare. The universal nature of the
obligation is reflected in Article 2(1) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, under which each state party undertakes to "respect and to ensure to all individuals . . the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." 6
In contrast, the resource-sensitive approach Professor Garro
discusses has strong resonance with the key obligation under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 7 Article 2(1) of that treaty obligates each state party to
"take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means." The
ESC Covenant does place binding obligations on states that ratify
it. A complete failure to do anything to ensure everyone adequate
housing, for example, is a breach of the duty to take steps toward
that end. 8 Plainly, though, the concrete content of economic and
social rights varies with the state's level of development. "Adequate" housing does not mean the same thing in a poor country as
a rich one.
The analogy between the two types of human rights and the
two approaches Professor Garro outlines might make investors
nervous about the resource-sensitive approach. Economic and
social rights seem less well implemented than civil and political
rights, precisely because they are resource-sensitive. Of course,
while measuring compliance with human rights is complicated, 9
violations of both civil and political rights and social and political
14. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Rethinking the "Universality"of Human Rights Law, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5-18 (1997).
15. E.g., Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct
with Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 4-17 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, eds., 1979).
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), Dec. 16. 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ESC
Covenant].
18. ESC Covenant, art. 11(1), supra note 17.
19. See generally, e.g., AnnJanette Rosga and Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The
Trust in Indicators:Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 253 (2009);
Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights: Principle,Practice,and Policy, 26 HUM.
RTS. Q. 906 (2004); Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the
Obligation to Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693 (1994).
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rights are widespread. Still, the mechanisms for enforcing civil
and political rights are, in general, much more developed than
those for enforcing economic and social rights. Only recently has
an individual petition mechanism for violations of the ESC Covenant been put in place,2° whereas the Human Rights Committee,
which hears individual petitions for violations of the ICCPR by
states that accept its jurisdiction, has been in business since
1977.21

One reason mechanisms for implementing economic and
social rights have been less developed is the very fact that the
rights are framed in resource-dependent terms, rendering them
less easily susceptible to judicial or similar enforcement. Article
11(1) of the ESC Covenant, for example, guarantees a right of adequate food and housing.22 Read in light of Article 2(1), though, the
obligation this right imposes on states is to use the maximum of
"available" resources to "take steps" toward the "progressive realization of the right."23 Enforcement of obligations of this sort poses
very difficult problems for any judicial or arbitral determination of
whether the right has been violated and what remedy is appropriate. The problem is not per se that developing nations have limited
resources. It is that most courts and arbitral tribunals are ill-positioned to make binding decisions about how to allocate limited
resources. How is any tribunal (particularly an international one)
to determine what resources are truly "available" and whether the
state has used them to the maximum-particularly considering
that there is a range of rights to be respected?
Not surprisingly, adjudication of economic and social rights
has proved difficult. Domestic courts have found violations most
readily where the state has failed abysmally. Even then, fashioning concrete, meaningful relief is difficult. The Grootboom case,
decided by South Africa's Constitutional Court in 2000, provides a
good example.24 South Africa's constitution guarantees economic
20. See Tara J. Melish, Introductory Note to the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 48 I.L.M. 256
(2009); Jan Kratochvil, Realizing a Promise: A Case for Ratification of the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 16 Hum. RTs. BR.
30 (2009).
21. P.R. GHANDI, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AND THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL
COMMUNICATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 29, 55 (1998).
22. ESC Covenant, art. 11(1), supra note 17.
23. ESC Covenant, art. 2(1), supra note 17. See M. MAGDALENA SEPOLVEDA, THE
NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT

ON ECONOMIC,

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 311-78 (2003).

24. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom, Case CCT 11/00 (Constitutional
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and social rights in a way similar to, though not identical with,
the ESC Covenant. 2 The Constitutional Court found a violation of
the right to housing when a local municipality evicted squatters
from privately owned land, leaving them homeless. It declined,
however, to specify a minimum core obligation regarding housing.26 Instead, it issued declaratory relief that left the government
with a wide degree of discretion, ordering it to "devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to
adequate housing."2 7
In one narrow respect, Grootboom might provide some level of
reassurance for investors caught up in the kind of situation Professor Garro describes. The Grootboom Court firmly stated that
governmental tolerance of land invasions could not be justified on
the basis of the right to housing.2" But it also illustrates the difficulties that courts face when the contours of a right depend on the
resources available to the state. In considering whether to order
even temporary relief to the plaintiffs, the Court was acutely
aware that "[1large sums of money" had already been spent to
increase the housing stock,2 9 and that the plaintiffs were "not
alone in their desperation; hundreds of thousands (possibly millions) of South Africans live in appalling conditions." ° The difficulty of judicial determination of how to allocate resources made
the Court draw back from ordering even temporary housing for
those whom the municipality had evicted (though it noted that the
government had voluntarily offered some alternative relief on the
day of the hearing before the Court). Irene Grootboom herself died
homeless some eight years later.3
Consider an arbitral tribunal attempting to assess whether a
Court of South Africa) (4 October 2000), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZACC/2000/19.pdf. For an account of the case by a member of the Court, see Albie
Sachs, Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 673
(2007).
25. See, e.g., S. Mr. Const. (Act 108 of 1996) ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), arts. 26 (right to
adequate housing), 27 (right to health care, food, water and social security), 29 (right
to education), available through http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/. For
a comparison of the language used by the Constitution and that used by the ESC
Covenant to express the obligations, see Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom
& Others, supra note 24, at
27-46.
26. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom, supra note 24, at I 33.
27. Id. at T 99(2)(a).
28. Id. at 92.
29. Id. at 53.
30. Id. at 80.
31. See Ibrahim Steyn, Access Rights No Guaranteeof Concrete Relief, CAPE TIMES
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state had provided "full protection and security" to a foreign investor in the circumstances Professor Garro describes. The task
might well seem daunting. Suppose, for example, that the state
asserted that it had done "the best it could have under the circumstances,"3 2 given that its law enforcement or judicial mechanisms
(or both) were simply overwhelmed.
This situation presents the strongest case for a resource-sensitive approach. Why, after all, should any investment treaty be
construed to require a state to do something it simply cannot do?
"Achieve the impossible" might not seem like an interpretation of
the treaty "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning"
of its terms.3 3 As Professor Garro notes, moreover, this standard
might seem fair to the investor. Due diligence before making an
investment might include assessing the level of protection the
state is capable of providing. 4
There are, though, two problems with this approach. First,
how did the state end up being overwhelmed-and what should
the tribunal make of the reasons for it? If the tribunal simply
assumed that the state had done everything it could to avoid the
problem, the resource-sensitive standard would too easily exonerate the state. If the tribunal looked beyond simple assumptions,
on the other hand, it would need to ask some very demanding
questions. Did the state invest less in its judicial and law enforcement systems than it could have? Should the tribunal take into
account the size and necessity of the state's military budget or the
efficacy of its tax collection system? After all, spending less money
on the military or increasing the government's tax revenues could
free up resources to improve its law enforcement mechanisms.
Equally important, either of these measures could allow the state
to address housing or land needs more effectively, avoiding the
land invasions in the first place. Rather than fault the investor for
failing to anticipate that a developing country might provide a
lesser standard of protection, one might fault the state for entering into a treaty to which it was not able (or prepared) to give full
adherence.
Second, how would the tribunal distinguish "doing the best
(South Africa), Aug. 11, 2009, at 9 (available in LexisNexis); South Africa: Death in
Shack Despite Ruling, AFRICA NEWS, Aug. 7, 2008 (available in LexisNexis).
32. Garro, supra note 2, at 274.
33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 Jan. 1980), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/englishlconventions/1l1969.pdf.
34. Garro, supra note 2, at 275.
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the state can do" (which would be acceptable) from "doing the most
it chooses to do" (which presumably would not)? 5 Suppose, for
example, that local law formally protected the investor under the
circumstances and the state's law enforcement and judicial systems were in fact capable of handling the cases-but the state
chose for policy reasons to limit its enforcement efforts or even to
abstain from them entirely. Of course, if those policy reasons
reflected discrimination against foreign investors, or an arbitrary
singling out of a particular foreign investor for rough treatment, it
would be easy to find them incompatible with the investment
treaty, as Professor Garro correctly notes.3 6 But these policy reasons might also reflect a different kind of judgment. The government might be acting-or rather, failing to act-based on genuine
concern for landless peasants who, facing destitution, sought to
cultivate land currently not used by the investor. Or its uneven
response might reflect political judgments about how best to deal
with organized land-invasion movements in the context of large
numbers of landless or land-poor peasants.3 7 Drawing the distinction between governmental incapacity and governmental choice
might not be impossible, but it would require some very intrusive
inquiries by the tribunal into the reasons for the government's
conduct.
So far I have addressed the insights the international human
rights law might have for deciding whether to adopt a resourcesensitive approach to the standard of protection under an investment treaty. It is worth asking a different question as well. What
impact might the adoption of such an approach have on the protection of human rights? The question arises because the argument is often made that the spread of investment treaty regimes
helps promote the rule of law. Restricting a state's power to act
arbitrarily in one sphere may reduce the state's propensity for
arbitrariness in others. States may also have an incentive to
improve their administration of justice and general adherence to
the rule of law to avoid giving rise to occasions for foreign investors to bring them up before international arbitral tribunals in the
35. See Muchlinski, supra note 10, at 225 ("the 'investment climate' cannot be
used as an excuse for bad governance where the host country is able to offer high
standards of administrative action but fails to do so").
36. Garro, supra note 2, at 274.
37. See CHARLES D. BROCKErr, LAND, POWER, AND POVERTY: AGRARIAN
TRANSFORMATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Rica and Honduras).

123-42 (1990) (Costa
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first place. 8
How much the enhancement of respect for the rule of law with
respect to foreign investments affects the protection of human
rights is an important question, one I need not attempt to answer
here. What matters is that if the connection is real, a resourcesensitive approach to the administration of justice in the context
of foreign investors' rights could be the basis for a similar
approach in the context of protecting human rights, including civil
and political rights. In part, the connection is simply conceptual.
It would be hard to think of a standard like "fair and equitable
treatment" varying with a nation's level of development, while
thinking of judicial protection of individual and group rights as
having nothing to do with the nation's resources. 9
The connection might also be more than conceptual; the
investment treaties might themselves dictate a connection. Suppose a state provided a resource-sensitive level of judicial protection to foreign investors, but an invariant (and perhaps higher)
standard of judicial protection to domestic investors. How could
that be compatible with the requirement not to discriminate on
the basis of nationality? And if the domestic legal system adopted
a resource-sensitive standard of judicial protection for domestic
investors in response to this problem, why would that approach
not spill over into the question of the level of judicial protection
for, say, torture victims or persons subject to censorship?
This would be a troubling development. The right of access to
effective judicial protection is central to international human
rights law. Consider the Inter-American Court of Human Rights'
judgment in 1988 in Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras." Interpreting Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights, which, like Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, obligates states to
"respect" and "ensure" the rights guaranteed in that treaty, the
Court laid down a stringent obligation. States have a duty "to
organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all struc38. E.g., Jan Paulsson, The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to
Foreigners, 1 J. INT'L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 341, 346 (2010) ("the network of BITs
[bilateral investment treaties contributes to the rule of law"); id. at 347 ("a country
governed in accordance with the rule of law has little to fear from BITs, or from
international tribunals").
39. Of course, as pointed out earlier, human rights law already has a relatively
invariant set of rights (civil and political rights) and another set that is more openly
resource-sensitive (economic and social rights). But the general lack of judicial
enforcement of the latter keeps the two fairly distinct.
40. Veldsquez-Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 91 (July 29,
1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989).
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tures through which public power is exercised, so that they are
capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of
human rights."4 1 It is not enough, the Court continued, merely to
recognize the rights on paper. Rather, states "must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention" and provide injunctive relief and damages. Recall
that Central America was wracked by armed conflict in the 1980s;
Honduras, a poor country, had a powerful military complicit in a
systematic campaign of disappearances.48 Yet none of this in any
way lessened Honduras' legal obligation to provide effective judicial and law enforcement protection against disappearances.
Indeed, not even in a state of emergency that "threatens the independence or security" of the nation is a state entitled to suspend
the "judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such
rights."44
These concerns point to the conclusion that arbitral tribunals
should go with a core minimum standard of "fair and equitable
treatment" or "full protection and security." In general, from a
human rights point of view, that approach would seem preferable
to making it expressly dependent on the level of the state's development. Still, Professor Garro's mixed approach-barring unequal
or arbitrary treatment but taking limited resources into accountcaptures two very important truths.
First, in reality, core minimum standards of civil and political
rights are not in fact as bright line as they appear to be. Consider
torture. Waterboarding is an egregious example. 5 But note the
disagreement between the former European Commission of
41. Id. at 324 (1 166).
42. Id.
43. Honduras: The Facts Speak for Themselves: The Preliminary Report of the
National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras 206-37
(trans. Human Rights Watch Americas & Center for Justice and International Law
1994), available at http://www.cja.org/downloads/Honduras-Report_%22TheFactsSpeak forThemselves%22.pdf.
44. Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human
Rights art. 27(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. See Judicial
Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9 (Oct.
6, 1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 513 (1988).
45. See David Stout, Holder Tells Senators WaterboardingIs Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2009; UN Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/
CO/2 (July 25, 2006), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/
432/25/PDF/G0643225.pdf?OpenElement.
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Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights on the
question whether the five interrogation techniques employed by
the U.K. in interrogating detainees in Northern Ireland amounted
to torture.46 The techniques were forcing detainees to stand for
hours spread-eagle against a wall; keeping them hooded all the
time except for interrogation; subjecting them to continuous noise;
depriving them of sleep; and depriving them of adequate food and
drink.47 The Commission called this torture; the Court said otherwise.48 Similarly, the prohibition on censorship is the subject of a
complex body of international human rights case law.49 Granted,
this kind of complexity does not stem from differences in resources
available to states. But what it does mean is that adopting a core
minimum standard approach would not necessarily produce simplicity or easy predictability.
Second, even civil and political rights are in fact resource-sensitive in an important respect. Consider, once again, torture. The
international law right not to be tortured is not simply a negative
right, entailing a duty on the part of the state to refrain from committing it. It is a positive right, requiring the state to undertake a
range of affirmative steps to prevent it and deal with it if it does
occur. These steps include making the judiciary genuinely independent and effective, and training and supervising law enforcement personnel. And they require time and resources, as the
record of rule-of-law foreign aid programs has shown. For all the
money poured into them, the effects of these programs have been
limited and their gains have come slowly.50 Borrowing the language of the ESC Covenant, it may well be more realistic to think
of the judicial protection of basic civil and political rights as something that states can achieve only progressively, in steps, using
46. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (ser. A) (1978); 2 E.H.R.R. 25
(1979-80), available through http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/
Decisions+and+judgments/HUDOCtatabase/.
47. Id. 96.
48. Id. J1 165 (Commission), 174 (Court). The Court did find them to constitute
"inhuman treatment." Id. 174.
49. See generally FRANcIsco FORREST MARTIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS & HUMANITARiM. LAW: TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 750-844 (2006).
50. Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD 3, 11 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
After more than ten years and hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, many
judicial systems in Latin America still function poorly. Russia is probably the single
largest recipient of such aid, but is not even clearly moving in the right direction ....
Aid providers have helped rewrite laws around the globe, but they have discovered
that the mere enactment of laws accomplishes little without considerable investment
in changing the conditions for implementation and enforcement.
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(ideally) the maximum of their available resources at any given
time.
In short, the notion of a universal, minimum core obligation
in the administration of justice-an obligation realizable now, not
in the future through progressive measures-may be something of
a fiction. It is, however, a useful fiction. Another way to put it is
this: Whatever one may think of the power of multinational corporations vis-A-vis states in a global economy, multinational corporations typically have more power in relation to the state than
do torture victims or victims of repression. Expressly giving a
developing state a break in the standard of the administration of
justice when it comes to the more powerful claimant asserting an
injury is unlikely to do the weaker victims any good.
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Pedro Martinez-Fraga*
First, I want to thank Professor Garro for his thoughtful
paper and even more thoughtful remarks. I have to confess that I
largely agree with him and will thus identify four basic questions
that go to the very root of his paper. Professor Garro's paper
reminds me of two works that are dramatically and distinctively
apart. The first, is Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach," and more
specifically the first verse of that poem "the sea is calm tonight."
The verse comes to mind because Professor Garro uses a seemingly innocuous paradigm: his personal experience in an ICSID
arbitration that dealt with the squatters.1 The second work that
comes to mind is Professor Gerhardt's book, "The Power of Precedent."' At the end of the day, that is what a large part of Professor
Garro's paper is about with respect to tribunals and investor state
tribunals.
A fundamental question that is inferred from Professor Garro
is the following: Do capital importing and exporting countries
reach a meeting of the minds when negotiating and implementing
a bilateral investment treaty? Or are they subject to the economic
limitations and conditions that - in the exercise of their sovereignty - will inevitably lead to material discrepancies between the
two? This is a fundamental point. This is not a question that
should lead to a theory of relativism, with changing standards
depending on the country. No, it is a question of whether we are
* Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga is a partner in DLA Piper's international arbitration
and litigation practice. Based in Miami, he is the firm's Coordinator of International
Disputes for Latin America and Florida.
Mr. Martinez-Fraga has significant experience and exclusively practices in the
field of international litigation and transnational arbitration, including complex
jurisdictional disputes concerning the common law and civil law issues, sovereign
immunity, act of state contentions, international investment law corporate
governance, anti-suit injunctions, cross-border energy disputes (oil and gas, cogeneration, and geothermal), asset tracing cross-border interim relief, and issues
concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral
awards. He has represented seven sovereignties in Latin America, in addition to the
Kingdom of Spain, together with geopolitical subdivisions and state
instrumentalities.
1. QuadrantPacific Growth Fund L.P. and Canasco HoldingsInc. v. Republic of
Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/08/1)
2. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008).
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in a moment of time, because of economic globalization, where
international law is seen as a failed project.
International law is seen as a failed project because it is the
law between states. In a time where global problems are shared
by all states and there is a movement toward a more global law. A
global law that from the point of view of humanity would be
responsive to issues such as poverty, global exploitation, corruption, the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and in effect underlying Professor Garro's paper, the quest for a
global law to remedy these global situations.
I will try to contextualize it in the area of investor state arbitration. If the answer is negative to the first question, then it is a
proposition that those administering justice should consider to
what extent are specific critical elements of the administration of
justice in investor state arbitration an objective definition of such
terms as "fair and equitable", "full protection and security", and
"most favored nation treatment" reasonable and legitimate in
terms of expectations. Here, I do think Professor Garro goes to
the very heart of the question. One of the issues that he raises is
what about the investor's due diligence in going into the host
country? Did not the investor investigate what is the rule of law
in the host country? Doesn't the investor have a whole history
with respect to the host country in terms of what kind of remedies
can be sought there? Isn't there a risk element that is assumed by
the investor by going into the host country? I think that's an element in Professor Garro's paper that is excellent and certainly
invites a lot of sustained analysis.
Another critical question that arises from Professor Garro's
paper is whether a new type of sovereignty has arisen in a world
of economic globalization. In other words, are bilateral investment treaties cutting so deeply into traditional notions of sovereignty that when the regulatory state is passing regulation that
impinges upon foreign investment for reasons of public health,
strategic resources, or public order, they are treated differently?
Is that really an indirect taking? Is that one of the risks that the
investor group assumes? Is this an issue that we should carve an
exception for in traditional models of sovereignty versus the new
model of sovereignty that we find forming and transforming itself
in this new era of economic globalization? I think some sustained
analysis there would be certainly welcome.
Throughout Professor Garro's paper there is something that
is a bit disturbing, and it is the following. We see a numerous
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references to the term "Latin America," and the problems in
"Latin America" and the disputes in "Latin America." I wonder if
in the context of investor state arbitration there is something that
we can identify for as particularly or idiosyncratically Latin American. Perhaps one way of approaching this issue is to think about
caducity proceedings in investor state disputes. In other words,
going back to Dean Schnably's point, the exhaustion of administrative remedies, which quite often in bilateral investment treaties involve carve-out provisions that call for the exhaustion of
certain remedies as a predicate to going forward.
These carve-out provisions are one way in which we can very
genuinely and legitimately say that that is a "Latin American"
process of justice particular to the territorial political subdivision.
Latin American, as opposed to being Central European or second
world, where the legacy of the Soviet Union and former Soviet
Block countries, leads us to find a lot of Central European investor-state disputes in which we can identify administrative remedies that tend to be different from those that we see in Latin
America. And perhaps that is a way of getting to Latin America in
a more focused way.
Finally, a fleeting observation on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. The last element of forum non conveniens is certainly
not an "adequate alternative system of law". It is an adequate
alternative forum, which is very different. It requires an analysis
of maximizing access to proof while minimizing the expense of getting to that proof. Now, to be fair to Professor Garro, there is an
element that he does talk about, which is whether in fact you can
get justice in a particular jurisdiction. That is a judgment call
from one court as to the system of justice in another jurisdiction in
another country. But, the case law and analysis on that particular
section of forum non conveniens, is very restrictive and limited to
about three or four rogue countries. Countries we won't mention
here, but we all know who they are. Therefore, that aspect is
really not an important part of the doctrine.
Audience Member:
I have a question for Professor Martinez-Fraga. You mentioned
precedent in investment state arbitration disputes. The problem I
see with precedent is that it is are merely persuasive. So you have
got in some instances long lines of cases that tribunals disregard.
What role do you think an precedent should have in arbitration?

290

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:2

Pedro Martinez-Fraga:
Right, that's an excellent question. The question of precedent in
investor-state disputes. Professor Garro is one hundred percent
correct, there is a very serious problem when we turn to ad hoc
arbitral tribunals that are not the subject matter of the state exercising sovereignty through the courts as is the case with judicial
systems. One ad hoc tribunal is not bound by the next even
though a lot of ICSID opinions tend to be or purport to be
grounded in precedent. What I do think happens, and I think it is
a positive element, is that there is a lot of doctrine and scholarly
material that has developed from these opinions tends to contribute to some sort of continuity, if you will, and some sort of uniformity and clarity. But the truth of the matter is that this is
problematic because they are just persuasive in nature and these
terms are very elusive.
Another problem that the tribunals have is that it is a tremendous challenge to try to harmonize conventional international
law and customary international law while, at the same time taking into account municipal law in rendering the decision. So that
is an extra problem. What I was trying to suggest is that there
are areas where the problems at issue, even though they arise in
the context of an individual state, are really problems that pertain
to humanity. The administration of strategic natural resources,
for example, is one of those problems. Healthcare is yet another
one of those problems. And the suggestion that where the state
exercises its regulatory powers in these limited capacities and categories, perhaps we should rethink the extent to which this exercise of sovereignty can be characterized legitimately as a taking.
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Comment
David Abraham*
There has been a very interesting convergence of topics since
this morning. I had earlier intended to start my remarks, in fact,
by saying that what was missing from this discussion of "rule of
law" and human rights was the issue of "sovereignty." Now, lo
and behold, Martinez-Fraga has just put it back in the center of
the discussion -where I think it might well belong.
Notwithstanding all of the policy debate that has taken place
since the onset of the Great Crisis, one doesn't very much, if at all,
hear the term "national economy." The term "national economy,"
or "Nationalokonomie" in the original German as coined by the
19thC economist Franz List, represents the notion that economics
exists for the sake of the state, the entire nation rather than for
the sake of utility maximization or individual actors. This conception of national economy was used to produce the powerful economies of Germany and the United States in the nineteenth century.
It is certainly what guided the Whigs and Republicans both before
and after the Civil War to make America a powerful new economy.
"National economy" featured a high tariff policy, import substitution and the development of a strong domestic market grounded in
strong production capacities.
Although criticized by some for being semi-autarkic, "national
economy" policies were key to the rise of both the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. Subjecting economics to national power development worked for the U.S. in the 19th century, for the Soviet Union
in the early and middle 20th century, and it was a policy of China
in the late 20th century, probably until the 1990's. Although we
think of China today as a mass exporter, and it is, China came to
its newfound power by largely removing itself from the world market and building internally. These internal development strategies sought to substitute for imports, build human capital
capabilities, and preserve foreign currency for the absolute essen* David Abraham, Professor of Law, received a B.A. in 1968, an M.A. in history
in 1972, and a Ph.D. in history in 1977, all from the University of Chicago, and a J.D.
in 1989 from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Prior to entering law school,
Professor Abraham taught for many years in the History department of Princeton
University. Following graduation from law school, he served as law clerk to Judge
Leonard Garth of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and as an associate
with Simpson Thacher & Bartlett.
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tials. There are strong resemblances between these policies and
those that seem to be working well for Brazil today.
But even when import substitution has not been at the core of
the strategy, what was at the core was the construction of a powerful state and a domestic surplus. What we subsequently saw in
the U.S. from the 1890s to the 1930s (and may still see in places
like China) is a social battle for the state and for the distribution
of goods along class and sectoral lines. That conflict could take
place within an increasingly democratic framework, as was the
case in the U.S. and much of the European continent. Stable capitalism within a democratic polity was not always achieved, just as
they have not always been achieved within free-trading countries.
What is consistently true is that it was not the free market or free
trade that was the incubator or the place of incubation for the creation of rights, for the creation of citizens. No, not the market, but
the state and the battle over control of it produced the conditions
for possible democracy.
The twentieth century was split worldwide between protectionism and free trade, and in the end it is unclear that there is a
consistent connection between those policies and political outcomes. (See Gourevitch, Katzenstein, Stephens and others.) It
was only in the latter portion of the 20th century that free trade
seemed to be the obvious winner, in terms of either economic efficiency or filiation with democracy. After World War II there was
certainly free trade but largely within either of two very fixed
blocs, the EU/US on one hand and the Soviet Bloc on the other.
Outsiders either went nowhere or tried to escape this domination
of what certainly some Latin Americans considered neo-colonial or
neo-imperialist domination characterized by commodity exports,
foreign borrowing, and consumer good importation. (The "development of underdevelopment" as it was sometimes called.) Mexico,
among others, somewhat erratically tried for a while a kind of
national economy of import substitution strategy. How much
wealth or democracy that created remains unclear even now, and
both friends and foes of NAFTA, for example, point to that period
to support their current positions.
Ironically it was the end of the Soviet Union that produced
the most extreme form of capitalism, namely the revolutionary
capitalism Marx had predicted back in the Communist Manifesto
of 1848, a capitalism under which "everything that is solid melts
into air" and which just blows tradition and other accumulated
social forms out of the way. This capitalism was an irresistible
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force, globalization and Washington Consensus combined, and
takes over the field. Countries like South Africa, emerging from
apartheid in this period, really no longer had the opportunity to
try an American or Chinese model of internal market and human
capital development. Although a huge country with lots of wealth,
in the regnant international context, South Africa did not have
really the opportunity to try to develop itself on the basis of a contained, internal, semi-autarkic development. Rather, it had to
become part of the international market immediately, thereby
sacrificing the opportunity to build internally in order to attract
foreign capital.
In sum, I don't think one can establish any clear connection
between international trade and human rights. It seems to me a
totally indeterminate relationship. When Professor Grossman earlier suggested that free trade encourages democracy, well maybe:
on the other hand we have the Chinese example to suggest that
that need not be true, and there is no evidence that Mexico's turn
to NAFTA free trade has done anything for democracy there. Does
free trade bring peace? Maybe. As far back as Montesquieu and
Montaigne it was argued that commerce brings peace because the
bourgeoisie is of a more pacific caste of mind than an aristocracy
whose roots are in the warrior nobility. (See Albert Hirschman on
"doux commerce.") It's not clear that that's an inextricable relationship either, since economic spheres of influence generally
require forceful protection.
Can foreign investment occasion improved domestic politics?
Both Garro's paper and the general discussion certainly have
raised that issue. On the one hand, one used to talk cynically
about establishing "favorable investment climates," which usually
meant a race to the bottom and the promise of the local government to repress any popular pressures for a share of the wealth or
"excessive" consumption. So, is a race to the bottom what foreign
investment relations' treaties are about? Perhaps that was once
true. Now, however, the question is whether we are in a new
phase where international agreements, soft law, best practices,
etc., provide a way to avoid that race to the bottom and avoid
international treaties being simply about protecting private people's money from the natives? Presumably there is now a level of
mutuality of advantage that acts as a constraint. There is, or
might be, some reason that the Colombian government might
commit itself to stop killing labor organizers (as opposed to the
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U.S. policy which is merely to fire them whenever they attempt to
organize).
Is there something in the mutuality of advantage that would,
for example, lead the Colombian government to undertake such a
commitment? I'm not sure. Pinning ones hopes for the advancement of decency and the rule of law on the security of property
rights is again; it seems to me, rather unwise. On the one hand,
property rights in the abstract, as we've known for a very long
time, are for all, provide all with some kind of guarantee of security, some kind of platform for human development, some kind of
basis for fighting back against power. On the other hand, property
is also the basis for the inequality that threatens democracy. To
have and to be are two very basic verbs that interact with each
other in all political relationships. Property rights are central to
individual freedom, but they are also the ground for that inequality that undermines, not only equality, but also perhaps freedom
and law itself, a problem that students will recognize from
Madison's Federalist 10 and Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins
of Inequality. Inequality is a natural outcome of freedom; on the
other hand, it threatens freedom.
So what political constellation will emerge? What is the contribution of these free-trade oriented treaties, bilateral or multilateral, to the emergence of a democratic politics? We have
focused here especially on Latin American, partly because this is
the area of the journal's commitment. One could talk about Southeast Asia; one could talk about Central-Eastern Europe. But
nowhere is the connection between the internationalization of
trade and internal democratization of the country more contested
than for Latin America. Indeed, for many years political parties
across South America were defined as either export-oriented (generally of commodities) or linked to foreign capital or domesticindustry oriented and linked to nascent domestic industries. The
Red/White-Colorado/National divide in Uruguay was typical.
Certainly if free trade were the chief basis on which domestic
populations looked for democratic opportunities and more equitable societies, it would be a thin reed indeed. If it is one at all, it is a
very weak mechanism for the establishment of more democratic or
equitable societies. The "rule of law" is surely a good thing, but
combine free-market free trade with legal enforcement, and the
results may be very mixed as far as democracy and justice are concerned. Let us take the example in Professor Garro's paper: If the
elimination of "squatters' rights" in order to assure foreign inves-
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tors is going to be the contribution that the rule of law as articulated in international trade agreements is going to make, then, in
fact, what we have is little more than an attack on the poor. Of
course, I would not propose that squatters' rights or adverse possession have been a major mechanism of democratic assertion by
the poor, whether in early modern England or contemporary Brazil. But if the goal of insertion of countries into international
agreements of this sort is to enforce a rule of law that is modeled
on stable, liberal, capitalist democracies into situations where
those do not exist, then it becomes just as possible that the future
course of development will be anti-democratic as democratic.
Free trade agreements may compel respect for property
rights, both on the books and in judicial and extra-judicial enforcement. The agreements we have been talking about may contribute to capital accumulation and foster investment, but of a very
particular sort, which we would not necessarily associate with
either democratic political rights or equitable social development.
Investors certainly do have legitimate expectations. It is certainly
true that changing rules on people in the middle of the game or
treating foreigners less fairly than domestic parties-opposition to
practices like those enjoys a consensus that certainly embraces
legal theory and scholarly world. At the same time, the turn to
reliance on private arbitral mechanisms suggests a lack of confidence in the local judiciary, but also in the administrative and
presumably the entire executive branch, to treat foreign investors
and foreign parties with the same respect as natives. This can be
either because the local judicial system is entirely unreliable for
anybody or because it would pick on and discriminate against foreigners, who presumably have fewer available resources (bribery,
influence-peddling, etc) to sway it.
So I think there are in fact not just hardware and software
issues, but there are also transactional issues that go to the internationalization of trade agreements. Further, there are issues of
internal development and democratization or non-democratization
that have now been linked to the internationalization or globalization of the economic arena. We should be cautious in our optimism as to the positive contributions they may make to future
development in developing countries.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

I think Mr. Robert-Ritter's question had two aspects to it: not
only was it about the unequal bargaining power between states,
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but it was also about the fact that each state has a political structure and a social structure which is going to be the deliberate or
accidental object of the negotiations. So, for example, we have
seen NAFTA operate not only as an agreement between the
United States and Mexico, but also as an agreement that has in
fact reshaped the Mexican social structure, economic structure,
and political structure. And these dramatic changes have not
been the product of democratic deliberation in either of the countries that produced the outcome. But yet, once in place, theses
structures constrain future political action. Certain options are
now foreclosed in Mexico. Mexico is much changed under NAFTA
in ways that no Mexican voter could have imagined. At the same
time, it is impossible to "democratize" NAFTA. I think perhaps
the best example of this phenomenon may have been Fernando
Enrique Cardozo, the former Brazilian president- probably the
only head of state ever to appear as an author in New Left Review,
the preeminent international Marxist journal of the 70's and 80's.
Once inserted into these structures, he introduced policies as head
of state that were entirely consistent with integrating Brazil into
an international capitalist economic order, even at the expense of
his putative constituency in Brazil.

